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Class Politics in Post-Boom Ireland: A Burgeoning 
Resistance? 
 
Micheal O’Flynn, Martin J. Power, Conor McCabe and Henry Silke 
 
In this paper we outline the features of an emergent 
resistance in Ireland. We examine its stunted development 
in the context of the period of speculative expansion 
known as the ‘Celtic Tiger’. We draw attention to the 
speculative nature of the Irish boom period, to the 
character of the subsequent crash, to the conditions that 
have enabled the financial interest to effectively close 
ranks, transferring private debt to the general population. 
Whilst acknowledging the apparently low level of 
resistance to all of this, we reject the notion that the 
population has meekly accepted all of the related cuts 
and impositions. We show that the apparent submission 
to the austerity agenda is quite deceptive, that forms of 
resistance are emerging everywhere, not least in 
education, and that these represent the potential for the 
development of a mass movement against austerity in the 
years ahead. Amidst relentless attacks on services, and on 
the living standards of the population, we trace the 
development of several different forms of resistance that 
have emerged, along with the continuing efforts to pull its 
various strands together to produce something worthy of 
the Irish working class. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The economic crisis in Ireland (beginning 2007/8) has been characterised by 
relentless attacks on public and private sector workers. The neoliberal and 
neoconservative assaults on education have certainly intensified. This fits with 
the overall response of the Irish government1 to the economic collapse, which 
from the very outset, has worked to offload the burden of debt from the 
financial sector onto the shoulders of the general population. The immediate 
response to the banking crisis was to socialise private debt, and thereafter, to 
implement cuts to services and introduce new taxes and levies on the general 
population. This has had an enormous impact on the wider economy and 
society. While the government has justified its actions in terms of ‘tough 
choices’ made in the ‘national interest’, the result has been a continuous 
worsening of living standards and prospects for the general population. Each 
austerity budget takes more money out of the economy. It is diverted away from 
necessary state investments, such as in education, and from essential services. 
With each austerity budget the rate of unemployment has risen, with the official 
rate reaching 14 per cent by 2011 (The Economist 2011). Given that the 
population has been unjustly burdened with debts that it did not incur, many 
wonder why there is so little sign of resistance. That question is the concern of 
this paper.  
 
Activism and Resistance against Neoliberalism/Neoconservatism 
To acknowledge a low level of resistance is not to write off Ireland as a 
potential site of mass resistance. On the contrary, the task of this paper is to 
                                                          
1
 The parties currently holding office in Ireland (April 2013) are Fine Gael (right-wing 
Christian democrats) and the Labour Party. The parties holding office when the economy 
collapsed were Fianna Fail (centre-right nationalist) and the Green Party. The parties holding 
office during the most reckless years of the ‘Celtic Tiger’ were Fianna Fail and the 
Progressive Democrats (Thatcherite). Sinn Fein (centre-left republican) has never held office 
in the state. The Progressive Democrats no longer exist and the Green Party has been 
eviscerated.    
outline the features of an emergent resistance, as the population gradually 
begins to respond to the disastrous influence of vested interests in the financial 
and property sectors, which has been so destructive of political, economic and 
social life in Ireland. To this end we begin with a brief historical sketch of 
Ireland’s economic collapse.  
 
Background to the Property Crash 
Through most of the twentieth century housing policy in the Republic of Ireland 
has been underpinned by extensive government support for home buying. Direct 
government support for home ownership included grants, tax deductibility for 
mortgage interest, and subsidised sales of social housing to tenants (O'Connell 
2005). The lack of regulation in the private rental market (including of security 
of tenure), meant that the only real long term option open to most was to buy; 
this ‘elimination of alternatives’ (McCabe 2011) made buying a property with a 
mortgage the only real option for the majority of people. The speculative 
activity that followed meant that home buyers would saddled with ever larger 
mortgages which, as will become apparent in the following section, has 
inhibited the propensity for mass resistance. As David Harvey (2009) reminds 
us, ‘debt-encumbered homeowners don’t go on strike’.  
 
Until the 1980s lending to lower income buyers was dominated (with 30 per 
cent of total mortgages) by the local government sector, while lending to middle 
to higher income buyers was dominated by state subsidised  building societies 
(Norris and Coates 2010 p.6; Fahey et al. 2004; Murphy 1994). Local 
government mortgages were strictly constrained to about three times the 
borrower’s incomes and stayed below average house prices.  It was difficult to 
get a loan greater than two and a half times income from the building societies 
(Baker and O'Brien 1979). According to Norris and Coates (2010 p.7) the acute 
fiscal crisis in the early 1980s led to the abolition and scaling back of most of 
the direct public supports for home ownership and forced local government to 
radically scale back local government involvement in mortgage provision to 
only 2 per cent of mortgage loans by value (Norris and Winston 2004). The 
proportion of housing stock owned and maintained by local authorities has 
fallen from 18.4 per cent in 1961 to 7.2 per cent by 2006 (Kitchin et al. 2010 
p.35). While commercial banks had been active in the Irish market since the 
seventies it was only following the withdrawal of fiscal subsidies for building 
societies in the mid-1980s that banks began lending on a significant scale.  
Between 1985 and 1987 the commercial banks percentage of the mortgage 
market went from 8.3 per cent to 36.9 per cent (Norris and Coates 2010 p.8). By 
the year 2000 this market was transformed radically into a liberalised and 
flexible market, dominated by commercial interests, and awash with 
international credit. In this period a second ‘elimination of alternatives’ forced 
home buyers into the arms of the deregulated commercial banks. 
 
In the late 1980s the commercial mortgage sector was deregulated (as part of a 
wider process of financial liberalisation). This included the abolition of 
quantitative restrictions on credit growth; the lowering of banks’ reserve 
requirement rations; the dismantling of credit controls and the removal of all 
restrictions on interest rates (Norris and Coates 2010, p.7). The Building 
Societies Act (1989) allowed building societies to operate in wholesale money 
markets and gave them the freedom to develop a wider range of property and 
financial services and facilitated their conversion to public limited status 
(Murphy 1994). During the 1990s three societies became PLCs while only two 
remain mutualised (Norris and Coates 2010, p.7).  
 
After entry into the Euro zone in 1999 the Irish banks increasingly borrowed 
from foreign banks to fund speculation, mainly in property.  Between 1999 and 
2008 the volume of inter-state banking rose from 31 billion euro to 150 billion 
euro. At the same time the banks channelled up to 60 per cent of domestic bank 
deposits towards property speculation (Allen 2009, p.48), which was not 
confined to the Irish market.  
 
Asset-price inflation saw the cost of an average house go from three times the 
average wage to twelve times in a decade (Preston and Silke 2011a, Preston and 
Silke 2011b, Silke 2012). The cost of owning a home would eventually exceed 
the capacity of workers to buy. With the eventual slowing of construction, 
coupled with the collapse of finance capital across the Anglophone world, 
investors and speculators began to panic.  
 
In the space of a few years residential properties in many parts of the county 
had lost close to half of their market values. Asset-price speculation came to an 
abrupt halt as banks all over the world began to worry about their loans and 
refused to fund any more speculative activity (Murphy and Devlin 2009, p.6). 
With the economic collapse, investors in property went bankrupt, which meant 
that they could not repay their loans. The Irish banks had borrowed heavily to 
fund this activity, and ended up owing tens of billions to European banks, 
without any means of making good on their loans. 
 
The Socialisation of Private Debt 
On 29 September 2008 a meeting to discuss the government’s approach to the 
bank crisis took place between representatives of Bank of Ireland and AIB, the 
Irish Central Bank, and the Department of Finance. It was held at Government 
Buildings. The details of the meeting – even who was exactly in attendance - 
are still subject to controversy. One thing is certain. In order to combat the 
problems faced by Ireland’s banking system, the government moved to 
‘guarantee all the liabilities – the customer and interbank deposits, and also the 
vast majority of bonds – of the six Irish banks’ (Ross 2009, p.193). On Tuesday 
30 September, Brian Lenihan outlined in the Dáil the bare bones of the Credit 
Institution (Banking Support) Bill. The government would guarantee ‘deposits 
and debts totalling €400 billion at six Irish-owned lenders in a move to protect 
the country’s financial system… the liabilities amounted to almost 10 times the 
value of the national debt of about €45 billion’ (Irish Times 2008). The apparent 
rationale of the government was that the Bill would allow Irish banks access to 
the ‘short-term funding that enables Irish financial institutions to fund their day-
to-day operations [and which] had become scarce in the global banking system 
since the collapse of US investment bank Lehman Brothers’ (Irish Times 2008). 
The bill was passed by the Dáil at 2am on the morning of Tuesday 2 October, 
by 124 votes to 18. The Seanad (the lower house) sat all night and passed the 
bill at 7.40am. It was signed into law at 3.30pm by President Mary McAleese – 
just shy of 33 hours after the release of Brian Lenihan’s press statement. The 
Minister for Defence, Willie O’Dea, told the readers of the Sunday Independent 
that weekend that ‘in the case of a problem [under the guarantee], the first call 
will be on the bank’s funds, on its shareholders, on their assets, capital and 
funds. This is a very significant buffer as the estimated total assets of the six 
financial institutions exceed their liabilities by about €80bn’ (O’Dea 2008).  
 
The problem was that while the expected income from these loans had collapsed 
– because of the commercial and residential property crash, coupled with the 
deepening recession in the economy – the money owed by banks to investors in 
bank debt was guaranteed. The gap between the money the banks could salvage 
from its loan portfolio on one hand, and the money the banks owed to its 
external creditors on the other, was now the responsibility of the Irish taxpayer. 
That which 24 hours previously had drowned in its own debt had been 
miraculously brought back to life. The Irish government had reanimated a 
corpse. It had created a zombie.  
 
The point to be stressed here is that the 2008 Irish bank guarantee was not 
designed to protect the national economy, the state’s citizens, or even the 
majority of Irish businesses from the effects of the crisis. Instead, its purpose 
was to protect that section of Irish society which drew its power, and continues 
to draw its power, from the very fault lines which were exposed by the crisis in 
the first place. The state’s role as a conduit for international finance; as a tax 
haven for both domestic and foreign enterprises; the promotion of construction 
and land speculation as entrepreneurship; and the development of services to 
exporters rather than the development of actual exports – these were the deep-
seated problems which exacerbated the crisis in Ireland. 
 
The two-year period between the bank guarantee and the EU/IMF intervention 
was a time when the controlling forces within Irish society revealed themselves 
in a way that had not been seen for decades. The scale and depth of the crisis 
made it impossible for the nature of their wealth to remain underneath the radar.  
The crisis brought clarity to the actual focus of the State’s economic and 
political system. What we see during those two years are the consequences of 
the empowerment of financial dealers and property developers, the glorified 
Maître d’s who meet and greet multinationals as they arrive on our shores, aided 
and abetted by the main political parties who are unable, or unwilling, to see 
any alternative. 
 
There appears to have been no question but that the government would move to 
safeguard the financial interest and the interests of developers. As we have 
pointed out, the immediate response of the government to the banking crisis was 
to guarantee loans made specifically for speculative purposes. The government 
also moved very quickly to set up schemes like the National Asset Management 
Agency (NAMA) – a ‘bad bank’ specifically designed to save the skins of 
property developers and speculators at public expense (Allen 2009, pp.140-
145). When faced with a decision about whose interests to defend the 
government would appear to have never wavered.  
 
It is clear that the government could have acted very differently. In order to get 
the country through the crisis the state could have quarantined the above loans, 
and those used for tax avoidance measures, such as the debt encouraged by 
section 23 (a key tax relief scheme for those investing in buy-to-let properties), 
while at the same time guaranteeing deposits. Instead, it decided to transfer 
responsibility for all loans onto the shoulders of the state; cut back on funding 
for education, health, pensions and welfare; increase tax on personal income 
and expenditure; and appeal to patriotism and a sense of duty. Its decision to 
borrow tens of billions of Euro to prop up dead banks and section 23 loans 
plunged the ‘real economy’ (the part of the economy that provides jobs) into 
free-fall.  
 
The financial crisis was global in nature, but Ireland’s almost fatal exposure to it 
was not a fluke or simple bad luck. Similarly, the reaction of the government 
was not because of moral failings, alcoholism, dysfunctional leaders, a lack of 
interest in the media or a lack of an ‘ear for strategic political advice’ (Burns 
2011). On the contrary, the government’s reaction to the bank crisis made sense 
– once it is seen that the logic was to cushion Ireland’s financial vested interests 
from the fall, with the plan to guarantee everything the most direct and secure 
way of providing that protection. At the same time, the economic and social 
myths which had built up over the previous fifteen years, of a prosperous land 
and a classless people, simply vanished. Ireland was a democracy, to be sure, 
with open and free elections, but it was far from governed in the interests of its 
people. Large swathes of the population appear to have realised this. Yet only to 
a very limited extent has the widespread discontent been translated into 
resistance. The Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) has organised 
demonstrations. However, since the trade union leadership has been unwilling 
to take a stand in the interests of workers it is routinely heckled by its 
membership. As such, the latest march organised by ICTU (on February 9th 
2013) did not have any trade union officials waiting to address the crowd when 
they reached their destination, Dáil Éireann (the principal chamber of the 
parliament). As a result, most of the marchers simply turned around and went 
home. Five years into the crisis and the population seems no closer to 
organising the kind of general strikes that have been witnessed elsewhere (in 
Greece for example). The obvious question is, why?   
 
Organisation of the Resistance 
A view that is widely held in post-boom Ireland (and abroad) is that the 
population has meekly accepted all of the cuts and impositions put upon them 
by their government. The Economist (2011) remarked that the ‘fiscal adjustment 
has, so far, been accepted by Irish people with surprising stoicism, despite a rise 
in unemployment to 14 per cent’. The government likewise commended the 
population for its ‘maturity’, and in April 2009, with apparent pride, the 
Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan declared that ‘the steps taken had impressed 
our partners in Europe, who are amazed at our capacity to take pain. In France 
you would have riots if you tried this’ (Irish Times 2009). However, the 
apparent surface calm can disguise growing tensions beneath.  
 
An incident that took place on Wednesday September 29 2010, and the popular 
reaction to it, may suggest a discontent that is yet to find a means of political 
expression. On that morning television and radio stations all ran with the same 
story: a 41 year old man had driven a cement mixer truck half-way into the front 
gates of the parliament buildings. Having blocked access he cut the hydraulic 
brakes and some electric cables, which meant that there would be considerable 
delay in removing it (RTE News 2010). The symbolism of this action was clear; 
here was a troubled builder using some residual equipment from a collapsed 
construction industry to cause a mornings inconvenience to the politicians 
responsible. 
 
Perhaps anticipating that the mass media would simply dismiss the action as 
‘deranged’, the driver made sure to spell out his motivations, literally, and in 
giant letters. He painted the words "Anglo Toxic Bank" (complete with the 
Anglo Irish Bank Logo) across the drum of his mixer truck (RTE News 2010). 
Whatever the merits or demerits of the action, the motivation was quite clear; 
the protest was directed at a government that had facilitated lending institutions 
and speculators at every turn, creating the biggest property bubble and the 
biggest financial crash in Irish history. It was directed at a government that 
redirected money previously earmarked for public investment and public 
services to cover the debts of private banks and private developers; so it was an 
illegal expression of a very legitimate and widespread discontent.  
 
Though this was an isolated incident, the sentiments could not be described as 
isolated. After all they were expressed in opinion polls, and materialised in the 
general election results in the months that followed. The general discontent of 
the population was certainly evidenced when the Fianna Fail-led government 
was unceremoniously thrown out of office in early 2011. This was to be 
expected since the party could not expect to bail out its financial backers and 
also keep its working class and public sector vote on board. This ‘riot in the 
ballot box’ decimated a party that had dominated Irish politics since the early 
decades of the 20th century. In the 2007 general election Fianna Fail won 78 out 
of a possible 166 seats, making it the largest party in the state. In 2011 Fianna 
Fail was down to 20 seats. As would be expected (in the wake of the economic 
collapse) there was somewhat of a breakthrough from the left, with a significant 
shift in support for the Labour Party, which was still perceived as a party 
attendant to the interests of workers. The Labour Party, perhaps benefitting 
from the fact that it was not in government for the most reckless years of the 
Celtic Tiger period, almost doubled its seats from 20 seats in 2007 to 37 in 2011 
(ElectionsIreland.org 2011). The rise in the support for Labour rested on 
working-class goodwill, coupled with claims to represent an alternative, and 
promises to stand against the parties of austerity. In this vein, in the run up to 
the 2011 general election, Labour leader, Eamon Gilmore, insisted that the 
Labour party would ‘not agree to having child benefit cut anymore and Fine 
Gael need to drop their plans to cut child benefit’. Fully aware that this was in 
tune with popular sentiment, the claim featured on the party’s election posters, 
which read ‘Protect child benefit, vote Labour’ (Browne 2013). Though the 
Labour Party leadership has reneged on this promise, along with virtually all of 
its pre-election promises, the votes for Labour did in fact signify a shift to the 
left, which is further evidenced by the drop in support for Labour as it reneges 
on each of its election promises (See RTE News 2013b). On top of the Labour 
vote, and the rise of Sinn Fein, which is broadly perceived to be a left-wing 
party (from 4 to 14 seats), there were five far-left politicians elected to office in 
2011 (ElectionsIreland.org 2011). Though the latter are seasoned socialist 
campaigners, they have not yet managed to work together in a manner that the 
situation now requires. There was a concerted effort in 2010 to create the 
‘United Left Alliance’. This involved drawing several different left forces 
together, such as the Socialist Party, the People before Profit Alliance (an 
umbrella group with considerable Socialist Worker’s Party membership), 
Socialist Resistance, the Workers and Unemployed Action Group (WUAG), 
and the Irish Socialist Network. The Worker’s Party and the Communist Party 
of Ireland were not included in the initial plans, and did not come on board 
thereafter. Though the project attracted considerable numbers of people, 
including many new activists, they were quickly repelled as the sectarian 
practices of the parties comprising the Alliance prevented the emergence of a 
healthy, vibrant organisation. The problems that emerged at this time have been 
examined in some detail (see Derwin 2012).    
 
In spite of the above issues, socialist representatives such as Joan Collins, Joe 
Higgins, Seamus Healy, Richard Boyd Barrett and Clare Daly have provided a 
very visible opposition, in the interests of the working class, which is 
desperately needed. Each has taken every opportunity to highlight what 
government policy will mean for workers, for the unemployed, for the 
vulnerable and those forced to emigrate. The new left opposition is also 
significant in that it is quite upfront about its intention to use its seats in 
parliament as a platform to appeal directly to the working class and to build a 
resistance on the streets and workplaces across the country and beyond.  
 
In 2012 the far-left was able to effectively facilitate and encourage mass 
opposition to the post-boom taxes (such as the ‘household charge’) imposed on 
the population. The fact that homeowners were required to register for the 
‘household charge’ tax, provided those liable with an opportunity to resist 
government policy, resulting in the emergence of a nationwide campaign, which 
now opposes austerity more generally (for further information see 
nohouseholdtax.org). The injustice of imposing the same flat charge on 
mansions and granny flats, the same charge on ultra-high-net-worth-individuals 
and the unemployed, was clear to all. So much so that the population did not 
require much encouragement to resist the government and boycott the charge. 
Aided by a well organised campaign, half of the people liable for the charge 
joined the boycott, despite letters threatening prosecution. The household 
charge was quickly followed by the imposition of a so-called property tax the 
following year. The left parties (those to the left of the Labour party) have 
sought to channel people’s anger at the imposition of this tax (and other 
proposed bailout charges) into an ant-austerity movement, with the ultimate aim 
of fielding a slate of anti-austerity candidates in the next election. The growth of 
the campaign against household and water taxes (CAHWT) is significant since 
it demonstrates a discontent, which has not yet found a coherent political 
expression, and has not yet managed to consolidate workers as a class capable 
of acting collectively as such. The potential for such action was evidenced at the 
CAHWT demonstration in Dublin April 13th 2013, which attracted over 5,000 
protestors (O’Brien, 2013). A considerable measure of the anger was directed at 
the Labour Party, which consistently refuses to act in the interests of workers. 
Admittedly, this campaign is only a response to the consequences of a much 
more significant imposition, the socialisation of private debt. The campaign is a 
resistance to one particular imposition, which has been foisted on some (but not 
all) of the population, but can nevertheless be used to build resistance to 
austerity. It does not in itself represent any challenge to the continued 
dominance of finance capital.  
 
Ireland has not produced much in the way of organised resistance to the 
socialisation of private debt, particularly when compared with Iceland, where 
the population forced the government out of office, forcing a repudiation of its 
responsibility for private gambling debt, and even jailed some of the bankers 
that destroyed the economy. The bankers had left Iceland in an impossible 
situation. But as Paul Krugman (2011) argues, ‘Iceland’s very desperation made 
conventional behaviour impossible, freeing the nation to break the rules. Where 
everyone else bailed out the bankers and made the public pay the price, Iceland 
let the banks go bust and actually expanded its social safety net’. It was clear 
that no matter the path taken by Iceland it could not avoid a collapse in living 
standards; but by refusing to placate international investors the burden on the 
population was limited, the rise in unemployment was limited, and the social 
safety net was maintained relatively intact. There has been no such 
confrontation with the banking sector in Ireland; Irish bankers have not even 
been stripped of their generous salaries. Richie Boucher, the Chief Executive of 
Bank of Ireland, received a pay package of €843,000 in 2012 – despite the bank 
posting a pre-tax loss of over €2.1 billion (Reilly, 2013). Though the dominance 
of finance capital is still reflected in policy, it has not yet received a level of 
scrutiny appropriate to its influence and effects. There are however a number of 
campaigns that are seeking to change this situation.   
 
One organisation set up to campaign specifically to agitate for the repudiation of 
private debt is Anglo Not Our Debt. This group of activists has successfully 
highlighted the unjust and illegitimate nature of Ireland’s repayment of private 
debts run up by the defunct Anglo-Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building 
Society. The campaign has worked to prevent the government and the corporate 
media from glossing over the fact that the general population bares no 
responsibility for the debts of private banks; that the debts are the responsibility 
of the private borrowers and lenders associated with the private institutions 
concerned. The campaign has continued to highlight the injustice and 
unsustainability of the agreed repayments to bondholders, and organises 
protests, publicity events and educational events on the issue all across the 
country, to counter the relentless spin the issue (for further information see 
www.notourdebt.ie). Similar efforts have been made on the part of a protest 
group that emerged in a rural part of Co. Cork in early 2011. The ‘Ballyhea 
Says No’ group is characterised by a sense of urgency and a level of doggedness 
that is inspiring to all lucky enough to witness it. Somehow a group of people in 
a rural part of Ireland, with no other political agenda, took it upon themselves to 
start a campaign, which has kept up a sustained and dignified protest, marching 
the streets every Sunday morning since March 2011. The group is tireless in its 
efforts to uncover the naked injustice of the on-going payments to bondholders, 
and in its efforts to counter all related propaganda disseminated by the state and 
the corporate media (for further information see 
thechatteringmagpie14.blogspot.ie). Their weekly marches have been covered 
by media all across the world, but apart from occasional guest appearances on 
the Tonight with Vincent Browne show, they have been virtually ignored by the 
Irish media – only reported reluctantly, such as when the group went as far as 
the head office of the ECB in Frankfurt to voice their opposition to the policy of 
forcing the responsibility of a European banking crisis onto the general working 
population of Ireland (Kerrigan 2012, pp. 208-09).  
 
The foisting of private debt onto the population has given rise to a number of 
laudable initiatives like this, all aimed at facilitating the emergence of a political 
consciousness and militancy appropriate to the development of a mass 
resistance. These initiatives are part of an emergent battle of ideas, which has to 
be waged against the parties of austerity, and the various institutions 
representing the financial sector. Activists know that working class 
consciousness advances through mass activity in campaigns that are rooted in 
working class issues. However, the process also requires the political 
development of the working class, which does not happen by osmosis, but 
through self-education, through the development and dissemination of ideas 
appropriate to self-emancipation. To that end a number of initiatives have 
emerged in recent years, such as Irish Left Review, Look Left Magazine and 
Rabble (see irishleftreview.org; Rabble.ie; lookleftonline.org). These are 
significant developments. The work being carried out by activists involved in 
Dublin Community Television (DCTV) is another arm of the process. 
Programmes like the Live Register and Dole TV provide alternative analyses 
that challenge the consensus of corporate and official sources (see dctv.ie). 
Similarly, educational groups, such as Praxis, have emerged with the view to 
facilitating the general working population, the unemployed and the 
marginalised in their efforts to reclaim the power to create, legitimise and take 
ownership of knowledge, rather than be subject to knowledge disseminated by 
elite institutions and 'experts' (see praxiseducation.weebly.com). Groups like 
‘The Provisional University’ build on these efforts, working to further activist 
research, to facilitate autonomous education, to promote discussion and to 
strengthen social movements (see provisionaluniversity.tumblr.com). Other 
interesting groups have emerged in the wake of the crisis, such as Unlock 
NAMA, which began with the task of demystifying the workings of the 
National Assets Management Agency (NAMA), demonstrating how public 
money is being used, but not necessarily in the public interest (for further 
information see unlocknama.org). Unlock NAMA dared to suggest that given 
the public responsibility for the management of assets and loans, local 
communities in which the associated properties are situated might rightfully 
have some say in how they are used - perhaps for youth groups, for child care, 
or some other benefit to the population. The activists involved made efforts to 
settle the issue, but in an unorthodox way. They began by identifying buildings 
controlled by NAMA, occupying them for the day and holding public talks on 
related issues. The question of ownership and control of NAMA buildings 
would be made clear as the activists were inevitably ejected (see 
unlocknama.org). 
 
Most of the above groups and initiatives emerged at around the same time as the 
Occupy Movement, the first Irish contingent of which was set up outside of the 
Central Bank on Dame Street in Dublin in early 2011. Though the project ended 
in disarray, it did bring people together. As one of the key activists Helena 
Sheehan (2011) explains, participants quickly began organising a series of 
sixties-style teach-ins. Those involved referred to these sessions as Occupy 
University, which involved focused attempts to bring some clarity to the 
situation. Talks were given on the global financial system. Attempts were made 
to draw lessons from earlier social movements. There were discussions on the 
media, on trade unions and on all manner of topics relevant to the system to 
which people found themselves opposed and to the movement they hoped to 
build. Sheehan (2011) remarked on the ‘sincere sharing of knowledge and 
earnest interaction, pursued with a purity of purpose’. In the space of two 
months there were 78 talks and workshops organised, amid all the hustle and 
bustle of a busy street (Sheehan, 2011), with all speaking, listening and 
organising with the view to changing society.  
 
Many were surprised with the widespread levels of support that the Occupy 
Movement initially enjoyed among the general public. But perhaps there should 
be nothing really surprising about this. The majority of people were (and 
remain) opposed to the use of public money to pay for the failed gambles of 
property developers and bondholders. The current Fine Gael/Labour 
government was only elected on the basis of promises that the interests of the 
population would be put before the financial interest.  
 
The conclusion that mass resistance is required to bring about change has not 
taken hold, despite the laudable efforts outlined above. This appears to be 
somewhat of a puzzle given widespread realisation that every successive 
austerity measure is a covert bailout for the financial sector. Though there are 
rumblings within particular areas, such as in education (which has experienced a 
relentless attack since the crisis began), and indeed among other workers in the 
public sector, resistance is still relatively understated. In that context we can 
only outline the emergence of an embryonic resistance in the remainder of this 
paper.   
 
Activism and Resistance within Education 
Along with resistance to neoliberalisation, resistance to its effects in education, 
to the relentless attacks on public education, has been constant, if sparse, over 
the years. Academics like Professor Kathleen Lynch for example have 
consistently written about the resultant inequalities in the Irish education system 
and wider society even during the Celtic Tiger boom period. The same cannot 
be said of the public sector unions however, with Allen (2000) describing them 
as having acquiesced to various governments throughout the Irish Social 
Partnership arrangements - arrangements which have been described as 
corporatism operating primarily in the service of Neoliberalism (see Boucher 
and Collins 2003 for a discussion).  However, it is noteworthy that the voices of 
dissent have grown somewhat louder since the onset of the economic crisis.  
 
Some unions – such as Unite – campaigned for and delivered a No vote from its 
members in relation to the Croke Park Agreement in 2010. In addition, it is 
significant that a number of public service unions campaigned for a No vote on 
the Croke Park 2 Public Service agreement, highlighting the detrimental impact 
that Croke Park 1 has had on the Irish education system. At the United Public 
Service “No 2 Croke Park 2” Rally on 11th March 2013, speakers from the 
Teachers Union of Ireland (TUI), Irish National Teachers Organisation (INTO), 
Association of Secondary Teachers, Ireland (ASTI), and the Irish Federation of 
University Teachers (IFUT) expressed their resounding rejection of the Croke 
Park 2 Proposals. In particular, Dr Mary Gilmartin (IFUT) highlighted the 
worsening of pay and employment conditions for academic staff the 3rd level 
sector since the beginning of the crisis. Dr Kevin Farrell (TUI) spoke of the 
negative effects for lecturers and students in the Institutes of Technology from 
the additional lecturing hours required under Croke Park 1. Dr Gilmartin called 
for all efforts to demoralize academic staff to be resisted, and she stressed the 
importance of public sector workers building a united front so as to protect the 
Irish education system. Such calls were obviously heeded by some as on March 
26th 2013, the TUI which represents just under 15,000 secondary school 
teachers and lecturers voted overwhelmingly (86 per cent) to reject the Croke 
Park II proposals (see RTE News, 2013 for a fuller discussion of TUI proposals 
in the event of government legislating for pay cuts in the public sector).  
 
We would argue that a potentially very significant moment in the resistance to 
the neoliberalisation of education in Ireland came when a young teacher, Evelyn 
O'Connor, made an impassioned speech when accepting the Irish Secondary 
School Teacher of the Year award in 2012 (a recording of the full speech is 
available at http://www.thejournal.ie/teachers-permanent-non-permanent-
evelyn-oconnor-teacher-of-the-yea-502993-Jun2012/).  
 
O’ Connor (2012) raised the issue of tenure for ‘new’ entrants to the profession, 
stating that despite “receiving this award for teacher of the year, I have no idea 
if I'll have a job in a year’s time” and how “because of a bizarre bureaucratic 
nightmare. … even though I've been teaching for 9 years, it'll be at least another 
5 years before I qualify for any kind of job security. Moreover, she highlighted 
how the state has taken away the allowance for career guidance teachers, 
abolished language support for foreign-national children and reduced special 
needs hours in schools throughout the country. In effect, she argued that such 
“cutbacks make me worse at my job through no fault of my own”. Her most 
damning critique however was saved for what she saw as a string of broken 
promises from the current government.  She argued  
“When we elected this government they proclaimed that “even in 
our country's crisis, we can make progress in education and protect 
frontline services”. They promised to “recruit, train and support the 
highest calibre of teachers”. Well I don't feel very supported and 
nor do the talented and experienced teachers up and down the 
country whose jobs are disappearing. Not to mention the new 
entrants to the profession who thanks to pay cuts will become like 
second class citizens in our staff rooms”. 
 
O’ Connor’s speech captured the fears and anxiety that non-permanent teachers 
now face, when she argued that “we are afraid to even say these things out loud 
because the government will try to use our complaints as an excuse to make 
things even worse for all teachers. We're afraid that if we make ourselves visible 
we might lose our jobs”. However in a very visible act of defiance O’ Connor 
(2012) proudly proclaimed that she was “tired of saying nothing and ... tired of 
being afraid. Non-permanent teachers have to stop going quietly because our 
students and our schools are suffering”.  
 
It is not too much to suggest that large sections of the working population are 
likewise tired of saying nothing, tired of being afraid, tired of watching injustice 
heaped upon injustice, and tired wondering why their fellow citizens have not 
yet developed an effective means of resistance. The conclusion that action is 
required has been reached by many people, but the various struggles that have 
emerged are still separated from one another, and the problem of how to bring 
the various struggles together to collectively confront the political and economic 
establishment has yet to be resolved. 
 
Conclusions 
The manner in which the economic crisis unfolds in Ireland is only intelligible 
when close consideration is given to the class relations involved, particularly to 
how the dominant economic groups operating within the country realise their 
income. But the reasons why resistance in Ireland is so slow-burning are far 
more obscure, particularly given the increasingly brutal attacks on living 
standards. It does have to be acknowledged that the anger and frustration of all 
those currently exploited and the oppressed has been spread across the globe 
with the return of mass emigration (Socialist Voice, 2010). The issue of 
involuntary emigration, which has been exasperated by government policy, has 
not yet been sufficiently politicised. It may be possible to extend some of the 
other strands of causation for this apparent inertness back to the religious, 
authoritarian cultural heritage of the population, or to the weakness of the 
indigenous industry/dependence on foreign direct investment for employment, 
or to the consequent atomisation of the working class, or to the decline in trade 
union membership, or to the general mal-development and general dysfunction 
of organisations representing the working class, or to various other historical 
developments and conditions. All of this is debateable. In the end, the resistance 
will have to be built. The Irish working class has to get to know itself once 
more, on the streets, and through the discovery and resolution of the obstacles to 
collective action, to the development of the necessary analyses, strategies and 
tactics that further the universal interests of the working class.   
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